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Five Theses on Public Media and Digitization: 
From a 56-Country Study 
 
DAMIAN TAMBINI1 
London School of Economics and Political Science, UK 
 
 
This article examines developments at public-service and state-administered media 
organizations based on a global sample of country case studies and selected secondary 
data. Most public-service and state media organizations have experienced a decline in 
revenue and audience and a tendency to weaken the program remit, but the overall 
direction of change is not one of uniform, marked, or irreversible decline. Although 
successful models of public service for the digital age have emerged, recent evidence 
suggests that neither the weakening of state broadcasters nor their reform into 
independent public-service media are inevitable results of digitization. 
 
 Keywords: public service, state broadcasting, regulation, independence 
 
Introduction: A Crossroads for National Media Systems 
 
The rise of broadcasting in the 20th century established new relationships among states, publics, 
and the media. Alongside private media, some countries established broadcasters with closer links to the 
state and a nonmarket model of accountability to the public. Relationships between these institutions and 
governments as well as other centers of power became key challenges, with some countries adopting 
direct state administration of broadcasters and others favoring independent public-service broadcasting. 
 
A unique set of institutional arrangements for broadcasting evolved in each national setting. In 
some cases, the constitutional framework defined fundamental duties for all broadcasters. In others, 
ownership and operation remained in private hands, with duties left undefined. In some countries, the 
market share of publicly owned broadcasters was small, and in others they were—and in many cases, still 
are—dominant. In all countries, allocation of broadcasting frequencies was the responsibility of agencies of 
the state. Broadcasting institutions generate the meanings and narratives that frame reality for citizens. 
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For this reason, governance of these institutions has been a source of conflict that resurfaces during times 
of change.  
 
State-administered and public-service broadcasters all over the world face challenges as they 
come to terms with the new realities of digital media. A major structural shift is under way, with uncertain 
outcome. Some have been able to parry the challenges of new competitors and declining audiences and 
grasp the opportunities afforded by new services and delivery platforms. Others, due to political and 
regulatory constraints or a lack of audience demand, have been less able to respond and have seen their 
audiences dwindle. How this process of adjustment plays out in each national context, and the extent to 
which new global and regional norms of governance emerge, will play a key role in the evolving structure 
of democratic communication systems for some time to come.  
 
After more than a decade of debate about how broadcasting governance should respond to 
digitization, this article examines the evidence about how it is responding. As outlined below, there is no 
shortage of theory about what is happening: Some claim that the fundamental economic models of state 
and public-service broadcasters are broken due to long-term decline in audiences and funding. Others 
argue that new funding models, as well as digitization-related reductions in costs, are offsetting these 
challenges, leading to a new golden age of public media. There are claims that broadcasters’ remits are 
being watered down and commercialized amid a radical restructuring of the basic regulatory compact that 
underpins broadcasting. And while some commentators argue that digitization leads to pressure for more 
independence of broadcasters from government, others are less optimistic. This article examines each of 
these claims in the light of evidence from the Mapping Digital Media (MDM) project, the largest 
international study of media policy ever conducted.  
 
The MDM project has focused on the particular dynamics and tensions faced by publicly owned 
broadcasters that enjoy state-granted funding and/or distribution privileges that have historically 
guaranteed huge audiences but also brought the danger of political interference. Nonmarket ownership 
and control is the common defining feature of state-administered and public-service broadcasters. It is, of 
course, important to distinguish between media controlled by the state and independent public-service 
broadcasters; thus, in this article I use the generic term state-administered/public-service broadcasters 
(SA/PSBs) when referring to the common group, but I make a distinction between the subcategories of 
state-administered (SA) and public-service broadcasters (PSBs) as appropriate. When I wish to stress that 
public-service organizations are providing services on nonbroadcast platforms, I use the term public-
service media (PSM). I return to the issue of how digitization impacts the balance between SA and PSB in 
the concluding section.  
 
Defining terms is a challenge when categories are essentially contested and phenomena rapidly 
changing. The SA/PSB category includes a range of institutions from China’s state-administered China 
Central Television (CCTV) to the independent Dutch public-service broadcasters that form NPO, the 
network of public-service broadcasters in the Netherlands. Although there are no generally accepted 
definitions, I define state-administered broadcasters to be those in direct control by party or state 
agencies; public-service broadcasters generally are not commercially run and have constitutional 
guarantees of independence from the state. This article examines both categories. This should not be read 
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as an attempt to deny the importance of the distinctions between state-run and independent 
broadcasters. Rather, the reason to combine these categories of broadcasters is that it enables us to 
compare and contrast the fortunes of both PSBs and SAs and identify common challenges with the 
evolution of various aspects of the state–broadcaster relationship. It also avoids the difficulty of creating a 
contested category of PSBs that would be disputed by those claiming that any given broadcaster is 
captured by state power. 
 
Theoretical Reflection: The Mapping Digital Media Study 
 
There has been a sustained effort on the part of media reform campaigners and nongovernmental 
organizations to use the reform opportunities triggered by digitization to encourage the transformation of 
SAs into genuinely independent PSBs. Many of those involved saw the digital transition as an opportunity 
to open up markets and transition state-controlled broadcasters into independent PSBs (see, e.g., Mendel, 
2011; Smith, 2012). Where PSBs were firmly established prior to the introduction of digital media, civil 
society campaigns have focused on renewal: The transformation of public-service broadcasting into “public 
service communications” (Tambini & Cowling, 2004) or “public service media” (Iosifidis, 2007, 2011; 
Jakubowicz, in Klimkiewicz, 2010; see also Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, 2007; Lowe & 
Steemers, 2012). 
 
Given the importance of these questions for democratic development, it is surprising that there is 
not more systematic research on the evolving role of PSB globally. Public debate is increasingly polarized 
and self-interested: Commercial media claim that they are in crisis and that free public media threaten 
their very existence.2 On the other hand, public-service media claim to be in crisis around the world due to 
the capture of policy by corporate interests (Freedman, 2008). Experts are divided. Michael Tracey (1998) 
announced the “decline and fall” of PSB some time ago, but Chris Hanretty (2012, p. 7), having reviewed 
the available evidence, argued that “public service broadcasting enjoys far ruder health that the declinist 
narrative suggests.”3 
 
Hence the Mapping Digital Media project, which commenced in 2009 and published its final 
country reports in 2014.4 Mapping Digital Media is primarily a series of country case studies.5 The lack of 
                                                 
2 See, for example, James Murdoch’s Mactaggart Lecture to the 2009 Edinburgh International TV Festival 
at http://www.theguardian.com/media/2009/aug/28/james-murdoch-bbc-mactaggart-edinburgh-tv-
festival. 
3 Hanretty’s survey takes very little account of the PSBs of Central and Eastern Europe. 
4 See http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/projects/mapping-digital-media. The author of this article 
was a member of the editorial commission, whose responsibility was to design the methodology and 
research template for country researchers and review data and reports. A longer version of this article has 
been published as part of this series. Cases were selected on an ad hoc basis to include the largest 
countries and those where media policy is undergoing the most rapid change. A full list of countries 
analyzed in the MDM study can be found at 
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comparative research in this field is perhaps due to the many methodological problems faced by 
comparative policy research on the basis of available data. The study encountered the following problems: 
 
1. Comparability of data. Media use data are collected in each national media market 
according to different standards and definitions, because data are generated 
domestically, usually for valuing advertising. Furthermore, methods are unstable over 
time.  
2. Selectivity. Research of this type involves subjective interpretation and selectivity on the 
part of the researcher. Making generalizations on the basis of a comparison of country 
reports therefore risks building castles on sand. There are three stages of selectivity: of 
the producer of the research template, the country reporter, and the comparative 
analysis.6 
3. Lack of availability of data. In many countries, particularly in developing countries, the 
data are simply not available. MDM reporters were encouraged to be pragmatic and use 
whatever reliable data were available to create a general picture. 
 
Despite these challenges, MDM findings can be employed to useful effect for: 
 
1. Generating hypotheses 
2. Rejecting hypotheses (if a number of cases seem to be exceptions to them) 
3. Giving provisional support to rules of thumb and qualitative insight about directions of 
change, best practices, institutional games and structures with potential tactical and 
strategic value to policy advocates 
4. Combining with data from other sources to add weight to claims and identify potential 
causal mechanisms 
5. Making intracountry comparisons. Within a country setting, for example, an assessment 
can be made of whether, over the time period of the study, output or audiences have 
increased, declined, or remained stable.  
 
What the MDM data cannot do is provide conclusive support for any causal hypotheses or general 
theories that link digitization and state-administered or public-service broadcasters. The data focus on 
what has occurred during the period of digitization, but this study does not attempt to separate that 
process from the many other transformations that are occurring in parallel—notably transitions from 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/projects/mapping-digital-media. On this basis, this article makes 
claims about global and regional trends. (Throughout this survey article, the Mapping Digital Media 
country reports are cited in the abbreviated form of “MDM [country name]”.) 
5 On the logic of comparative and case study research, see Skocpol (1984) and Yin (1994).  
6 The country studies were prepared on the basis of a common template containing three types of 
questions: (1) those that required comparable quantitative data, (2) those for which data sources were 
suggested but direct comparability unlikely, and (3) subjective assessments. The MDM data on SA/PSB 
contained only type (2) and (3) questions and therefore do not provide quantitative support for 
comparative claims.  
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authoritarian rule and the economic crisis and from reflexive reactions to these various transitions, such 
as this study. Most of the theses examined in the next section cannot be confirmed or rejected on the 
basis of MDM findings, but the data may lead us to be skeptical about some, lend support to others, and 
help us develop a more nuanced account. 
 
This article therefore is concerned with five key assumptions and hopes of commentators 
concerned with SA/PSM and the transition to digital:  (1) that the transition has led to a collapse in the 
audience, (2) that revenues have declined, that (3) the remit is being watered down in a commercial 
environment (4) that the basic legal and regulatory institutional setting for SA/PSB is in crisis and, finally 
(5), that the digital transition encourages state-administered broadcasters to become independent PSBs. 
These theses are all derived from the theoretical literature referenced in each section. The ambition is to 
examine the qualitative evidence provided for them by the case studies in the selected country chapters 
as well as additional secondary data. 
 
Five Theses on SA/PSB and Digitization 
 
1.  The audience for state-administered/public-service media is in decline. 
 
As access to new services expands, many argue that SA/PSB inevitably suffers audience losses, 
particularly among the young. International comparative research confirms that viewing of publicly funded 
channels has declined as a proportion of total television viewing between 2009 and 2011 in the United 
Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Russia, and India (Ofcom, 2012, Figure 3.38). Some MDM 
reports, which focus on the period 2005 to 2010, identify the rise of new digital channels in competition 
with PSB as directly responsible for audience declines (see, e.g., MDM Slovakia, p. 27). 
 
Audience decline is neither rapid nor inevitable. MDM data indicate that there are some places— 
Canada, Australia, and Sweden—where SA/PSB audiences did not decline between 2005 and 2010. Even 
in these countries, however, there is an indisputable longer-term trend of decline in the relative share of 
broadcast audience of SA/PSBs, which appears to be exacerbated by digitization.  
 
The data do not permit us to attribute audience declines solely to digitization. In Turkey, for 
example, digitization coincided with the end of SA/PSB monopoly. This led to a rapid decline of audience 
for the advertisement-funded SA/PSB between 2005 and 2010. The precipitous decline in the SA/PSB 
audience in Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, contrasts with the gradual decline in most 
other countries with significant PSBs.  
 
In some countries, SA/PSM experienced audience growth: Argentina’s Canal 7 (from a very low 
bottom in the 1% to 2% range) has increased its audience. However, this growth is due to the channel’s 
acquisition of soccer rights rather than a sudden popularity of public-service journalism. In Armenia, the 
state-administered broadcaster H1 maintained—and, to a certain extent, increased—its audience in the 
last decade. In China (where TV ownership and audiences are rising), all five of the top-rated TV news 
programs and indeed all major national television channels are broadcast by the state-administered China 
Central TV, which remains the only truly national broadcaster in China. 
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Ample evidence suggests that a well-run, trusted PSB can thrive even during periods of audience 
fragmentation. MDM Estonia reports that the PSB ETV has managed to maintain audience shares of 
around 15% and improve audiences in some demographic groups such as the more educated. In the 
longer term, audiences have declined somewhat with increasing competition since the 1990s, as ETV has 
dropped more populist programming such as game shows to focus on public-service programming (MDM 
Estonia, pp. 27–28). Conversely, where the PSB is less trusted and the PSB is a government propaganda 
mouthpiece, as is the case with RTM in Malaysia, audience declines have been seen as an opportunity for 
commercial competitors who seek to improve their trust with the audience (MDM Malaysia, p. 38).  
 
MDM reports do show that some decline of audience share and reach on broadcast platforms is 
almost universal for SA/PSBs. A limited exception is found in countries where access to television 
broadcasting is still rapidly expanding, such as Morocco—though even here, audiences for the PSB have 
declined as a proportion of total television audience (MDM Morocco, p. 25). Even where PSB channels are 
in decline relative to other broadcasters, the rise in television viewing per viewer per day in most countries 
means that more PSB television is being viewed in absolute terms. This applies to most European 
markets, though multiscreening (simultaneous use of several media) must be taken into account.  
 
Even where audiences for PSB channels remain high, viewers may be watching less PSB remit 
content. Tambini (in Tambini and Cowling, 2004) observed that audiences tended to migrate away from 
PSB remit programming as channel choice expanded during the digital transition (see also Just & Puppis, 
2012, p. 364). But some SA/PSBs have large audiences on new platforms. The MDM reports reveal a 
divide between those PSBs able to mitigate audience decline on their main channels by launching new 
digital services and those still reliant on traditional platforms. Although individual channel audiences are 
declining, the launch of new channels (many of which have lower PSB obligations) compensates. France 
Television, for example, has not launched new channels for Digital Terrestrial Television (DTTV). but it has 
made France 5, a 24-hour channel, and launched a new information service using DTTV. In general, 
audience declines are much less pronounced in radio thus far, although radio switchover may change this. 
 
In some areas where SA/PSB numbers are down, new services provided by SA/PSBs such as 
mobile, online, and on-demand have compensated. There appears to be one group (many European 
countries, such as the UK) where online services are compensating and another group where PSBs are not 
able to launch new services in digital media. NHK in Japan, for example, has been tightly constrained to 
broadcasting and broadcasting-related services and has limited online offering (MDM Japan, p. 30).  
 
2.  PSM funding is in decline. 
 
It is widely assumed that, as a consequence of declining audiences, the revenue of PSB channels 
has been in decline all around the world. Many have seen the end of receiver license fees as an inevitable 
result of audience decline and digitization: “The principal funding source for public service broadcasters—
the license fee—will not survive for long unless it is radically rethought” (Open Society Foundation, 2005, 
p. 41). 
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As digitization progresses, a more complex picture is revealed. Expressed as a proportion of 
overall television revenue, the role of public funding varies extremely widely: from zero in China (where 
funding is not transparent, but state-controlled CCTV is 100% funded by advertising) to Japan (which 
raises US$8–9 billion in license fee revenue per year) (MDM Japan, p. 61; see also MDM reports, Section 
6; Ofcom, 2012, Figures 3.1, 3.18). 
 
 
 
 
    
Figure 1. Public service media total funding in the European Broadcasting Union Area (2006– 
2011). EBU data provided by Roberto Suarez Candel. Data are drawn from 54 organizations in 
2006 and 52 organisations from 2011. From Open Society Foundation (2014). Digital 
Journalism: Making News, Breaking News. Mapping Digital Media Project. New York, NY: Open 
Society Institute. 
 
 
 
International Journal of Communication 9(2015)  Five Theses on Public Media and Digitization 1407 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the overall level of PSB revenue in the 39 member countries of the European 
Broadcasting Union. The overall funding level of PSBs did not decline, but remained stable over the period 
2006 to 2011.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Public-service media funding mix in the EBU area (2006–2011). Source: EBU Media 
Intelligence Service, 2013. From Open Society Foundation (2014). Digital Journalism: Making 
News, Breaking News. Mapping Digital Media Project. New York, NY: Open Society Institute 
 
 
Although overall revenues have been static, the balance of revenue types has changed. The EBU 
research shows a slight shift of PSB funding from advertising to license fees and other public funds. In 
part this reflects the removal of advertising funding from public-service broadcasting in France, and in part 
it reflects the crisis of advertising funding, which is more sensitive to audience losses and the overall 
economic environment. Advertising funding for PSB is vulnerable. In general, the digital transition has 
seen increased volatility of PSB funding (see Kleis Nielsen & Linnebank, 2011; Ofcom, 2012, Figure 3.18). 
 
PSBs in smaller and poorer markets—for example, Moldova, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia—
have always faced particular challenges because of the difficulty of maintaining the high per-capita 
revenues necessary to fund quality services. But even with smaller markets, the story is not one of 
universal decline. SA/PSBs in Moldova and Bosnia have gained in both audience and funding in recent 
years (MDM Moldova; MDM Bosnia and Herzegovina).  
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A combination of austerity and an aversion to state funding programs creates new risks for some 
funding models. In Africa, in particular, where state and public broadcasters have relied heavily on direct 
government grant and other forms of direct funding, “the adoption of new economic policies, which favor 
reduction or the elimination of subsidies to state linked enterprises mean that state grants will no longer 
be necessarily available” (Mbaine, 2003, p. 157). This political and ideological opposition to state-aided 
broadcasting comes alongside the impact of the economic crisis and pressure on public spending, but the 
data just reviewed suggest that commercial advertising models have suffered more than taxation or 
license fee funding. According to Papathanassopoulos and Negrine (2010, p. 144), “As a result of the 
economic downturn we may be entering a period when the British duopoly model triumphs: a strong 
public sector and a strong(ish) commercial sector.” 
 
MDM reports show no overall pattern in the ratios of public to private media funding and revenue 
levels between 2005 and 2010. It is not appropriate to base inter-country comparison on this data, 
because how data were gathered varies between countries (some include state advertising, for example). 
However, pooling the data does provide a useful indication of change over time. In many cases, public 
funding has fallen in absolute terms during this period of spending cuts, and in others it has remained 
constant. Commercial broadcasters have also experienced revenue declines, particularly in advertising-
funded services. The Ofcom data (see Figure 3) therefore mask considerable country-level variation. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. TV industry Revenues, by Source, 2007–201. Ofcom analysis based on data taken 
from PricewaterhouseCoopers Global Entertainment and Media Outlook 2012-2016. UK 
revenues are based on a selection of 54 countries worldwide from the PWC Outlook research. 
Details on countries can be found at http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/global-entertainment-
media-outlook/territory-segments-digital-forecast-overview.jhtml. Source: Ofcom. (2012). 
International communications market report. London, UK:  OFCOM. 
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Although global figures suggest continuity in ratios of public (license fee and taxation) and 
commercial (advertising and subscription) revenues, some countries have experienced more radical shifts. 
In South Africa, public funding shifted from 39% of the total funding in 2005 to 51% in 2010, whereas in 
Georgia it shifted from 15% to 32%, and it also increased in Russia. In Moldova, in contrast, it decreased 
from 19% to 13% over the same period.  
 
These apparent jumps in funding can be explained by one-off payments to enable PSBs to cope 
with extra expenditure and advertising revenue losses due to digitization rather than any long-term shift 
in commitment to public funding. It is also the case that flows of funding to broadcasters may increase for 
political reasons when elections are approaching. 
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Figure 4. Evolution of the public-private ratio of funding in selected countries, 2005. From Open 
Society Foundation. (2014). Digital Journalism: Making News, Breaking News. Mapping Digital 
Media Project. New York, NY: Open Society Institute. 
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Figure 5. Evolution of the public-private ratio of funding in selected countries, 2010. From Open 
Society Foundation. (2014). Digital Journalism: Making News, Breaking News. Mapping Digital 
Media Project. New York, NY: Open Society Institute. 
 
 
In summary, although a slight relative decline in the funding of PSM occurred, with some PSBs 
even reporting a PSB funding crisis (Slovakia, South Africa, and Poland), public funding does appear in 
absolute terms to be a relatively robust funding source, fluctuating less than advertising. The funding 
settlement is more complex than these direct forms of revenue, however, and a longer-term assessment 
should take into account tax policy and spectrum as indirect support.  
 
SA/PSB funding reform inevitably raises questions about independence: A shift from license fees 
to government subsidy (see MDM Germany; MDM Netherlands; MDM Spain) may be a threat to 
independence. But the shift to direct government funding does not lead directly to threats to 
independence. Broadcaster independence can be questioned even where there is funding via a license fee. 
Recent crises at several European PSBs such as the Greek PSB and the Valencia PSB (see Crusafon, 2013) 
illustrate the potential for funding crises and reform to undermine independence and the difficulty of 
executing reforms without threatening independence. New forms of licensing (e.g., levies on 
telecommunications companies and direct grants from government) could create more problems for PSM 
independence than traditional viewer license fees and advertising, but they may be the only option if the 
goal is to secure public-service alternatives to commercial media. 
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3.  The remit for state/public media is contested, and standards are under threat. 
 
MDM reports show that PSB remits fall into three categories: 
 
1. Those based on defined genres of content (for example, impartial news, information, 
educational programming), as in Thailand (MDM Thailand, 2010, p. 27). 
 
2. Those based on social functions of the broadcaster(s) such as serving citizenship (e.g., 
Peru, Egypt, and Germany). 
 
3. Those based on general values and/or fundamental rights (e.g., Romania).  
 
Most are hybrids of these types (MDM USA, p. 39), and none are easy for regulators to measure. 
With lack of clarity come political discretion and challenges to independence. State broadcasters, in 
contrast to PSBs, do not tend to have a public statement of remit and responsibilities, but they are subject 
to authority and accountable to political power.  
 
MDM reports confirm the following pressures and trends: 
 
1. Increased commercial competition leads to pressure to meet the demands of audiences 
and advertisers rather than the pursuit of cultural or educational objectives. 
 
2. Digital innovation undermines remit definitions that are based on broadcasting 
technologies and raise questions about whether public service has a role in new media. 
 
3. These and other trends call into question the institutions responsible for monitoring and 
enforcing the remit.  
 
Historically, both state-administered and public-service broadcasters pursued ideological goals 
before market demand. With digitization and increased competition, they find it necessary to provide more 
attractive content to secure an audience. This leads to a catch-22: SA/PSBs need to compete with 
commercial media, but as a result, they are accused of populism—providing content indistinguishable from 
that of commercial competitors and watering down their propaganda or public-service remit. If, on the 
other hand, SA/PSBs choose to remain closer to their propaganda, cultural, or educational remit, this 
might lead to perceptions that they are dull and old-fashioned, further compounding the audience crisis.  
 
This section focuses on public-service rather than state-administered broadcasters, because the 
catch-22 is more of a threat to them. According to Beckett (2008): 
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There is a danger that public service journalism will effectively become a rump financed 
by the world’s more welfarist governments, like the railways in post-war Britain or the 
postal service in Italy—dull, inefficient, out of touch with the latest technological 
developments, and servicing an ageing sector of the public. (p. 37) 
 
This prospect has led other experts to ask: “In a system characterized by market competition and 
audience fragmentation, what is the distinctive contribution of the public service provider?” (Kuhn, in 
Iosifidis, 2010, p. 168). This question was identified as key as long ago as 2002, when a report 
commissioned by the BBC analyzed how different PSBs around the world were choosing between 
distinctiveness on the one hand and market share on the other (McKinsey, 2002, pp. 4, 22). A 2013 
repetition of the study found that PSBs create a “race to the top” whereby the PSB sets a benchmark and 
raises the quality threshold for the market as a whole (Simon, 2013). 
 
In response to this, the PSBs described in MDM country reports often perform a balancing act, 
both observing the remit and attempting to be attractive to audiences, with limited success: A focus group 
study in 2010 (MDM Thailand, p. 26) found that some Thai viewers struggled to distinguish the output of 
the independent PSB from that of the state broadcaster. Elsewhere, as in Italy, commentators have 
criticized PSBs for output indistinguishable from that of commercial broadcasters (MDM Italy). 
 
Digital innovation also poses the question of whether the remit of public-service media should 
extend beyond broadcasting. Many commentators have argued that digitization should lead to the 
evolution from public-service broadcasting to public-service media or public-service communications 
(Iosifidis, 2007, 2010; Jakubowicz, in Klimkiewicz, 2010; Tambini, 2004). However, Priebs (2004 found 
that in Germany and Japan, restrictive remits and regulations limited public-service activities to 
broadcasting and broadcasting-related services and acted as a restraint on the launch of new digital 
services by the PSBs (ZDF and NHK). According to Brevini (2010), the Italian PSB RAI spent only 0.2% of 
its total budget on online services, in comparison to the BBC spending of around 5%.  
 
In many MDM countries, the debate about PSB remits in the digital age is ongoing, and there is 
no consensus about new roles and rationales in the online space. Director of the BBC Mark Thompson 
argued that the PSB should seek to serve sub-audiences as the “new tribes” of PSM users, and do so on 
all potential new platforms as “martini media,” which are accessible any time, any place, from anywhere 
(Thompson, 1999, cited in Price & Raboy, 2003). But other PSBs, particularly in smaller markets, have 
retrenched to their core PSB mission and the defense of smaller national identities in the face of 
globalization (MDM Estonia, 2013, p. 27). 
 
MDM reports show that a large and growing number of countries apply some general public-
service obligations to all broadcasters (e.g., Italy, Brazil, Chile), but these general requirements have not 
been effectively enforced. Often they do not apply to new channels and online services, and there is often 
a lack of clarity regarding how public-service obligations apply to DTTV services. In many markets, all 
licensed broadcasters must ensure that news is impartial, but the extent to which these obligations apply 
to digital platforms is yet to be resolved in most countries. As an example, the UK public-service 
broadcasters Channel Four and ITV should under the Communications Act 2003 also seek to promote 
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public-service principles through their services. However, the shift to digital has involved an ongoing 
loosening of these obligations in negotiations with the regulator over license terms.  
 
In Chile, the Law of Correct Operation of broadcasters in theory applies a set of public-service 
principles to all broadcasters. The regulator has the responsibility to ensure that broadcasters of television 
respect “the Nation’s moral and cultural values, dignity of persons and protection of the family, for 
pluralism; for democracy; for peace; for the protection of the environment; and for the spiritual and 
intellectual formation of children and the youth” (MDM Chile, p. 41). In general, this form of principle-
based regulation has not been successful. Vague aspirational principles are difficult to enforce, and if they 
were enforced, it would be regarded as an attack on broadcasting freedom. 
 
The reports confirm that the PSB catch-22 is undermining PSB innovation. For example, surveys 
of perception of the public-service broadcasters in Thailand (MDM Thailand, 2010, p. 26) and Germany 
(MDM Germany, p. 29) indicate that they are perceived as somewhat dull and old-fashioned. Most PSBs 
are experiencing difficulty reaching younger audiences. There is a need for a policy decision if this is the 
case: If the view is that a mixed broadcasting system of PSB and other commercial channels is a long-
term goal, then it may be necessary to relax genre-based remits to create more popular broadcasters (see 
MDM Germany). 
 
It is possible to identify a few options regarding the PSB remit:  
 
 Uphold the remit. The PSB can focus on core PSB remit programming such as news, 
education, and culture. Few have chosen this route, though some (such as Estonia) have 
adopted this pure PSB approach.  
 
 Dilute the remit—and risk undermining PSB privileges such as the license fee in the long 
term. Some evidence suggests that there is less news provided as part of the remit in 
Sweden and Egypt, for example. Quality public-service news is one of the most 
expensive genres to produce, and several MDM reports highlighted tendencies to cut and 
paste news as a cost-cutting approach. 
 
 Develop a new remit—for example, by updating it to permit the launch of new online, 
mobile and on-demand services. The policy debate about the role of public service and 
innovation in the new world has been dominated by a discussion of crowding out of 
commercial by publicly funded services rather than a discussion of what the public 
interest demands in the new digital environment (Barwise & Picard, 2014; Simon, 
2013). New, updated remits have been outlined in many European countries, and even 
in Germany and Japan a remit more conducive to public-service innovation has been 
agreed upon (see, e.g., MDM Sweden, p. 26). 
 
 Change the enforcement and monitoring framework, including who is subject. There are 
several instances of advertising-funded public-service broadcasters exiting the public-
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service system (Sweden’s TV4, for example). In Europe, in particular, state aid 
regulation increasingly requires a clear and consistently applied remit (Levy, 2012). 
 
In countries where there is political will for a managed transition to post-broadcasting PSM, a 
number of these options were pursued. The Swedish commercial PSB TV4 has effectively ceased to be a 
public-service broadcaster, but the main PSB has been permitted to launch new online services after a 
government commission concluded in 2010 that “public service internet activities were legitimate and 
should aim at reaching as many people as possible” (MDM Sweden, p. 26). Where established PSBs have 
been able to develop a compelling PSM offer in new platforms, the PSM provider is among the biggest 
providers of news. In the United Kingdom, for example, the BBC leads on some platforms, and in Spain 
RTVE is the second most visited site. In other cases—for example, in Japan and, to a certain extent, 
Germany—regulation has prevented the development of public service on new platforms. 
 
In an international context, there is some evidence of policy learning between countries and the 
emergence of global norms regarding the remit of PSB/PSM. For example, where the PSB mission is 
codified in law or regulation, there are some family resemblances among those mission statements. The 
list of principles of the broadcasting service in Peru, for example (MDM Peru, pp. 30–31), bears a strong 
resemblance to similar principles in Germany and the United Kingdom. More research is necessary to 
ascertain whether an international convergence with regard to the PSB mission was taking place. 
 
4.  Digitization undermines the traditional regulatory toolkit for SA/PSM. 
 
Digitization has led to a fundamental rethinking of how SA/PSM should be funded and regulated. 
France and Spain have seen important legal changes with PSBs (e.g., RTVE) not being permitted to carry 
advertising. Elsewhere, as in Sweden, public-service obligations on some broadcasters have been relaxed. 
Despite attempts at standardization, there is no universally accepted definition of public-service 
broadcasting.7 Table 1 outlines the range of institutions and structures underpinning broadcasting 
governance in the MDM reports as ideal types.8   
 
 
                                                 
7 International organizations including UNESCO, the Council of Europe, the European Commission, and the 
United Nations Development Programme have developed several declarations and principles on public 
service broadcasting. See Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers (1994); European Commission 
(2009); and the list of resources noted in United Nations Development Programme Bureau for 
Development Policy (2004)According to the UNESCO Media Development Indicators (UNESCO, 2008), 
“PSB is broadcasting made, financed and controlled by the public, for the public. . . . It is free from 
political interference and pressure from commercial forces.” An ISO standard for public service 
broadcasters, ISO 9001, also has been used to accredit a few broadcasters (see Cheneviere, 2009;   
www.iso.org/iso/livelinkgetfile-isocs?nodeId=15354090). 
8 The institutional basis of media governance has been described by Puppis (2010) and Donges (2007). 
This article develops this approach stressing the importance of legal and regulatory relationships within a 
social compact of privileges and duties (Syvertsen, 2003; Tambini, 2012).  
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Table 1. The Public-Service Media Compact. 
Framework 
type 
Content 
accountable to 
Rights Duties Examples of 
broadcasters 
State  Government Funding, access to 
distribution, must-carry 
rules, Electronic Programme 
Guide (EPG) prominence, 
monopoly 
Propaganda, 
universal availability, 
fundamental rights, 
protection of minors 
CCTV China 
Public service 
(PSB) 
Public as 
citizens, 
parliament 
Funding, access to 
distribution, must-carry 
rules, EPG prominence 
Public-service remit, 
universal availability, 
fundamental rights, 
protection of minors 
STV Sweden 
Commercial 
PSB 
Consumers, 
shareholders, 
regulators 
Funding, access to 
distribution (on terrestrial), 
must-carry rules, EPG 
prominence 
Public-service remit, 
universal availability, 
fundamental rights, 
protection of minors 
ITV UK 
Commercial  Consumers, 
shareholders 
 
Basic speech rights, fair 
competition, access to 
distribution (at commercial 
price) 
Fundamental rights, 
protection of minors 
TV Globo 
Brazil 
Other:  
public news 
agency, 
subsidized 
press/media 
Consumers, 
regulators 
self-/co- 
regulation 
councils/ 
shareholders 
Funding, oligopoly/ 
monopoly/access to news 
 
Obey law, 
self-regulate 
 
Agerpres/ 
Mediafax 
Romania  
Schibsted/ 
Aftonbladet 
Sweden 
Note: Based on Mapping Digital Media reports, 2013. 
 
 
The top row in Table 1 outlines the position on state broadcasting, and the other lines describe 
various forms of PSB and commercial media. The precise arrangements for these key institutional 
relationships and the relative importance of them in the power relationships between governments/parties 
and broadcasters are subject to volatility and redefinition during the transition; in particular: 
 
 Broadcast/spectrum licensing may become less important as services move online and 
on-demand.  
 
 Decisions on whether the PSB should be permitted to launch new services become more 
important to the long-term survival of the PSB. 
 
 Competition rules and their application to the PSB are more contested and increasingly 
impact questions of the remit of PSBs. 
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 New forms of intervention, such as net neutrality rules, access requirements, and must-
carry rules, can be provided in support of public service. 
 
The value of spectrum as an informal subsidy of public-service activity should theoretically 
decline as alternative distribution channels open. With the rise of alternatives to terrestrial broadcasting, 
the value of these licenses declines, but there is a huge uncertainty about rates of decline. With the rise of 
mobile services, there is pressure on governments to reassign spectrum hitherto used to deliver public-
service media—for example, the UHF bands previously used for terrestrial television broadcasting.  
 
The impact of clearing terrestrial spectrum of PSB varies, because many broadcasters have no, or 
weak, PSB obligations. All MDM country reporters were asked to consider the level of public-service 
obligations on commercial operators. Although country reporters mentioned few formal public-service 
obligations on broadcasters, there are a number of instances in which the constitution categorizes some or 
all broadcasters as services of public interest rather than as purely private organizations (MDM Brazil, 
Section 2.2.2). These legal requirements, which sometimes include obligations to broadcast public 
information in emergencies, are often seen as endangering the independence of PSBs and can be a source 
of tension and mistrust. This was often the case in the Latin American context—for example, in Brazil 
(MDM Brazil) and Guatemala (MDM Guatemala, Section 2.2.2.). 
 
In many countries, commercial PSB is an alien concept.9 Where there are general licensing 
requirements for broadcasters to meet minimum public-interest requirements, one interesting finding of 
MDM reports is that in some countries these apply only or principally to the digital terrestrial platform, and 
such obligations are either diminished or absent on new platforms, including digital terrestrial. Broadcast 
licenses in terrestrial TV frequencies are the main vehicle for this “spectrum for service” deal. These 
licensing obligations often are not adequately enforced, and the potential for leveraging funding for PSB in 
this way is clearly in decline on evidence from MDM reports. 
 
In Europe, the remit dispute has led to the creation of the so-called public value framework 
whereby PSBs must prove that new services contribute to the public interest before they can be funded in 
accordance with EU competition law. Several of the correspondents expressed concern that public value 
tests may undermine the PSM in the long term (e.g., Sweden). They raised concerns about effectiveness 
(Germany), objectivity, and cost of implementation (UK until 2006). Although a transparent framework 
that sets out the evidence base for a decision to grant or refuse permission for an independent 
broadcaster to launch a new service is in principle good for PSB independence, public value tests are not 
objective.  
 
In 2003, Syvertsen remarked that digitization of television “continues to decimate the array of 
privileges that governments have at their disposal to grant to selected broadcasters” (2003, p. 160). 
Whereas SA/PSBs enjoyed privileged access to consumers in the form of monopolies and privileged 
spectrum access, in the new digital environment they have weaker distribution privileges and have to 
                                                 
9 See the various reports, Section 2.2.2. Many vague formulations of general responsibility of commercial 
broadcasters exist, but these are rarely enforced (see, e.g., MDM Russia, p. 29). 
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compete with commercial media. Commentators (Collins & Murroni, 1996; Ofcom, 2004) have argued that 
the commercial PSB sector has been particularly vulnerable during the process of digital switchover. The 
MDM reports confirm that the basic compact of public-service media is indeed under threat in many 
countries, but also state that with political will some aspects of it may be possible to maintain. 
 
The complex balances of regulatory assets applied to public-service media do not apply to state 
media in the same way. The MDM reports show that state-controlled broadcasters are more likely to be 
free to launch new services (e.g., Nigeria, Kazakhstan), whereas independent broadcasters face controls 
and restrictions.  
 
5.  State-administered broadcasters are undermined by the digital transition, creating 
demand for independent PSBs. 
 
The digital fairy tale of media reform activists is: Once upon a time, a state broadcaster suffered 
audience collapse in the context of rising digital competition. This inevitably led to demand for more 
diverse, independent news and an irresistible groundswell of pressure to either reform the state 
broadcaster into an independent public-service provider or create a new PSB.10 
 
Unfortunately, the MDM reports provide little evidence that the fairy tale is true. Such a view 
assumes that viewers will actively seek out new sources of independent content. In practice, audiences 
may stick with a state broadcaster even when there are other choices, and even if they do migrate to 
other services, private broadcasters are likely to be captured by some interest group or another.  
 
The MDM reports are not universally pessimistic, however. Although no direct causal relationship 
exists between digitization and PSB independence, it appears that the introduction of commercial 
competition has led some viewers and listeners to become less trusting of PSB and state broadcasters 
because they are exposed to a wider range of views, opinions, and professional standards. In Jordan, 
audiences for state-controlled JTV news have dipped below 50% of the TV news audience since 2008 with 
the rise of satellite TV. In Estonia and Thailand, increased demand for public-service material was 
reported, but such demand is weak and may not lead to financial sustainability for PSM. Citizens may 
continue to mistrust information provided by public broadcasters if they have a history of a lack of 
independence or view remit programs as boring or worthy (e.g., MDM Thailand, p. 26).  
 
So it is understandable that many continue to hope that digital choice will lead audiences away 
from state-controlled media. However, of 43 of the MDM countries studies where reliable data could be 
found, 32 of the SA/PSM providers appeared in the top five most used sources of news (see all MDM 
reports, Section 1.3.1). Even where the PSM providers were state controlled, they remained among the 
                                                 
10 This is a somewhat simplified summary of the optimistic position of some media reform activists. Most 
are less naïve; see, for example, Smith (2012).  
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most used news providers.11 Of 19 countries where data were available and the broadcaster was clearly 
state controlled, 14 were among the five most popular sources of news, and there were only five instances 
in which the broadcaster was clearly state controlled but failed to appear among the list of most used 
news sources. States apparently have not lost control of distribution to the extent that users are moving 
decisively away from state broadcasters to more independent sources of news. It is also likely that sport 
and premium content, rather than quality, independent news, drives audience. Independence of the PSB 
seems to have made little difference. In the 14 countries where PSM were identified as clearly 
independent, they were more likely to appear in the list of most used news sources (12 countries) than 
not (2 countries). 
 
In many regions outside the PSB heartlands of Europe—in Kazakhstan, for instance—PSB is 
simply not understood as a concept, and digitization has brought no pressure for reform. The South 
African PSB SABC is somewhat independent, but Africa contains a number of rapidly developing media 
markets that tend to have state-administered media of limited independence from the state and a large 
proportion of foreign public funding (see also Panos Institute, 2012). In Nigeria, for instance, the federal 
broadcaster is involved in a joint venture with Chinese state media (MDM Nigeria, p. 31). The continent 
also contains the countries with lowest gross domestic product per capita, with lowest TV and radio 
penetration and the most distant digital transitions. The SA/PSB in Congo, for example, is poorly funded 
and is not available over the whole territory of the country (see AfriMAP, 2013). 
 
But there are pressures and opportunities for change. In almost all the markets studied, many 
consumers have gained access to new services in the last decade due to digitization. In only a few cases 
(e.g., MDM Kazakhstan; MDM Pakistan, p. 29) have regulators successfully excluded new broadcasting 
channels from terrestrial spectrum during the digital transition. But even in Pakistan, new broadcasting 
entrants on other platforms have put some pressure on the dominant state broadcaster. This is not an 
isolated case: Malaysia (MDM Malaysia, p. 38) and Kenya (MDM Kenya, p. 30) provide examples of new 
entrants leading to significant pressure for reform of state-administered broadcasters. 
 
MDM reports thus show that, although digitization has not broken state broadcasters, it may have 
undermined them. In particular: 
 
 Where state broadcasters are captured by particular political interests, audiences tend to 
decline as digitization makes alternative sources more widely available. 
 
 In an environment of intense competition for audience from not only television but other 
platforms such as the Internet and mobile, PSBs and state broadcasters both tend to 
lose audience (with some exceptions, such as Chile and Argentina). 
                                                 
11 A researcher was asked to code the reports according to whether country reporters gave a clear 
indication of whether the public-sector broadcaster was categorized as (1) state administered, (2) 
independent public service, or (3) hybrid or transitional. This was checked against main nongovernmental 
organization reports such as Freedom House and Reporters Without Frontiers. 
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 The PSB can at that point become a pressure group for editorial independence, 
particularly if it is suffering a revenue decline and job losses.  
 
Public broadcasters face uncertainty and a need for political agreement on a renewed statement 
of purpose as well as transitional funding if they are to survive the digital transition. There is a need for a 
clear publicly debated restatement of the desirability of the mixed system and the necessity of public-
service media in the digital age. In most countries (especially Moldova and Japan), such a debate has not 
taken place outside of narrow technical circles.  
 
The proven ability for state broadcasters to (1) maintain broadcasting share and (2) transition 
dominant positions into the online environment shows that independence is not the only or even the best 
way to guarantee audience. More analysis is necessary to understand the detail of audience shifts during 
the transition, but if state broadcasters are in a position to monopolize talent and premium content such 
as sports rights they may be able to use this influence to maintain news dominance. 
 
Where there is widespread public awareness that broadcasting content may be captured by 
political interests, digitization and choice may increase pressure on the PSB to become more impartial. For 
example, in Italy, Romania, Malaysia, Georgia, Kenya, and, to a certain extent, Japan (where NHK has 
legally been independent since 1950), broadcasters face pressures to become more impartial.  
 
This, however, depends on wider pressure from civil society to ensure that bodies using valuable 
public resources (license fees, spectrum) do serve a wider public interest and not a narrow political 
interest and a significant level of transparency and understanding regarding the potential for state 
capture. In Thailand, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Canada, for example, where the perception of 
PSB independence and impartiality is stronger, there is less pressure for change. Nonetheless, PSBs may 
be vulnerable to political pressure if they do not have patrons in power with a commitment to the 
principles of independence.  
 
Some state-administered broadcasters are not under genuine pressure from new commercial 
competition, and they remain tightly controlled by the state. They are being permitted to launch new 
services to the exclusion of potential competitors. For example, in Kazakhstan, the state broadcaster has 
been permitted to launch new digital niche channels. These benefit from must-carry rules and have the 
effect of excluding new entrants from the market (MDM Kazakhstan, p. 44). Similarly, in China, CCTV has 
been permitted to launch new channels to the exclusion of new entrants on the dominant terrestrial 
platforms. As a result, while new competition has arisen in the form of regional and municipal channels, 
CCTV has been able to maintain a national broadcasting monopoly by launching new services in 
competition with its own existing channels. 
 
In sum, digitization and increased choice does not make the decline of state-controlled 
broadcasters inevitable. Other considerations (for example, control of sports rights, production budgets, 
access to talent and celebrities) rather than public-service values likely determine demand for a broadcast 
service. Only where there is widespread awareness of the value of PSB independence among audiences is 
it likely that expanding digital choice will lead to audience migration away from state-controlled media. 
1420 Damian Tambini International Journal of Communication 9(2015) 
 
 
The central question for national PSM is whether they can be successful in maintaining a position 
in a mixed communications ecology of commercial and publicly owned media. Most national governments 
have offered very little long-term vision and policy direction in answering the question of whether PSM are 
fundamentally a phenomenon of the century of analog broadcasting or whether they should be able to 
flourish in the new digital communications cornucopia. The MDM data offer some indication of their ability 
to develop in the web environment. Only in a minority of cases (the UK and the Netherlands) do the PSM 
appear in lists of the most visited websites. Regulatory and political constraints have clearly hindered the 
development of state and public-service media in the web space. 
 
State-Administered/Public-Service Media Go Digital:  
Virtuous Circle or Death Spiral? 
 
Audiences of state-administered and public-service broadcasters are declining almost 
everywhere. But this masks a more complex picture. On one hand, SA/PSBs in some countries have 
launched new services on new platforms to offset broadcast audience loss. And the content these 
organizations are delivering is changing, too. In the more competitive digital environment, there appears 
to be a move away from specific genres such as state propaganda, or public-service programming genres, 
to more commercial programming. Whether such developments are desirable, and whether they are 
permitted to occur, will depend on local conditions.  
 
There are some cases where audience decrease, a tightening of the remit, and funding reductions 
create a self-reinforcing spiral of decline, and some others in which innovation and new services create a 
virtuous circle of reform. MDM reports observe both of these developments. Sweden could be cited as an 
example of virtuous reform, where a clear policy commitment has permitted public-service innovation and 
the PSM enjoys both independence and high levels of public support. Turkey, on the other hand, is an 
example where rapid audience decline and a funding squeeze are difficult to reverse amid rising public 
criticism. And this will not inevitably lead to more broadcaster independence. Where public support is 
weak, PSBs may become more reliant on political support. 
 
The future of both state and public-service media is uncertain. Although many examples exist of 
successful innovation in public service, there are others where PSB is in crisis. On the other hand, despite 
some examples of potential pressures for increased levels of independence from the state, state-
administered broadcasting seems well adapted to survive the digital transition.  
 
Only in Europe are the institutions of independent PSM in a strong position. There, the norm of 
the mixed broadcasting system may be becoming more prevalent with the incorporation of state-
administered broadcasters from Central and Eastern Europe into the conventional PSM model, and 
regulatory changes such as the Communication on the Application of State Aid Rules to Public Service 
Broadcasting (2009). In the Middle East and North Africa, PSB independence faces numerous challenges. 
The absence of the model in the rising powers of Brazil, Russia, and China makes the question of PSB in 
India and South Africa of great importance in global terms (see MDM country reports; Ofcom, 2012, 
Tables 3.16, 3.17). 
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All five theses have received some support from the evidence, but there is no simple 
deterministic outcome, and there are exceptions and qualifications that need to be noted. SA/PSB 
audiences do tend to decline, but what this means for audience revenue or the potential to water down 
the broadcaster’s unique remit varies from country to country. The transition to digital calls into question 
almost every aspect of the fundamental social contract upon which SA/PSM is based. On the basis of the 
evidence contained in the MDM reports, however, it is rare to have an open and transparent debate about 
the policy settlement for the long-term evolution of the relationships among state, public, and media, 
because the policy process almost everywhere is characterized by strong and opaque links between 
political interests and broadcasters.  
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